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Statement of Contribution 
This work is motivated by the increase in the number of premium store brands over the past 
decade, now such store brands may be more expensive per unit volume than national brands. 
vVith this perspective, in this work we explore advertising and pricing decisions national and 
premium store brands can make. We develop an analytical game theoretic model using a 
quadratic advertisement cost function. Using this model we characterize the advertising and 
pricing decisions each of the brands will make under different market conditions. We find 
that in some cases only the national brand or the store brand will advertise, both brands will 
advertise, or no brand will advertise. In the case when pricing and advertising decisions are 
made in unison, we find that a national brand is better off free riding from the advertising 
efforts of the store brand. Alternatively when pricing and advertising decisions are made 
sequentially or separately, we find that either of the two brands may advertise as determined 
by market conditions. It is such insights that may not be exhibited in practice, that we hope 
will be considered by brand managers. 
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Abstract 
As the propensity of premium store brands increases, retailers must consider differ­
ent ways to drive sales besides promotional strategies. With this in mind, we consider 
a national brand and a (premium) store brand co-existing in a market. Each brand 
has to decide the amount to invest in advertising its product and the prices to charge 
its customers, which can be determined separately or in unison. When either adver­
tising expenditures or pricing decisions are set, each brand must keep in mind that 
the advertising efforts and revenue may spillover between the two brands, customers 
that intend to purchase the national brand may end up purchasing the store brand and 
vice versa. We derive an analytical model of the situations described and characterize 
equilibrium advertising decisions. We find that the characteristics of a premium store 
brand may depend on which marketing/promoting instrument (advertising or pricing) 
is the primary method for driving demand; and in some situations a national brand 
may be better off to not advertise at all and instead let the premium store brand carry 
out all of the advertising. 
Introduction 
In this paper we consider a national brand (NB), also referred to as a manufacturer, and a 
store brand (SB), also referred to as a retailer, within the same marketplace. We characterize 
the equilibrium advertising strategies of the NB and the SB as a function of market state. In 
particular, we consider whether the market has spillover demand or not, and whether there is 
profit sharing amongst the national and store brands. Though they have been around since 
the 1950s (Pa.t.ti and Fisk, 1982), the majority of store brands still compete with national 
brands based on price using some form of promotion or pricing strategy. However, as the 
market share of private labels increases (Kumar and Stecnkamp, 20()7), more retailers are 




be more expensive than national brands (Karp, 2012). In these situations the SB, retailer, 
may actually want to advertise its product, and not let the NB, manufacturer, do all of 
the advertising. In this paper we first present the general model we consider. We then 
derive the advertising decisions each brand will make given that prices are fixed a priori, 
similarly the pricing decisions each brand will make given the advertising decisions are fixed 
a priory. Finally, we present the advertising and pricing decisions each brand will make if 
both decisions are made in unison. 
We use a Stackelberg model, with the national brand as the first mover in this paper. 
As discussed in detail in Section 3, we consider both advertising and pricing decisions made 
by each of the brands. We assume the NB and SB consider only one product, or a single 
product category, and not a collection of products/categories as Erdem and Chang (2012) 
show there may be cross categorical affects for both store and national brand. In solving for 
the optimal advertising and pricing levels, we find situations where the store brand will want 
to advertise in conjunction with the national brand. Similarly, there are situations when 
the store brand will not want to advertise at all and let the national brand do all of the 
advertising. Surprisingly, we find cases when the national brand will want to let the store 
brand do all of the advertising. We also find that the characteristics of a premium store 
brand may depend on which primary method is used for marketing/promoition (advertising 
or pricing). These results provide managerial insight as to possible reactions by a national 
brand to a new premium store brand. 
In the remainder of the paper we first discuss related work in Section 2. We then, 
in Section 3, introduce and formally discuss and solve the advertising/pricing models. In 
Section 4, we present some managerial insights gleaned from our analytical results and 
conclude the paper. 
Related Work 
While there is rich literature in studying the dynamics between national and store brands, 
for a comprehensive and excellent review, see Sethuraman (2009), that compiles and assesses 
results from analytical models with empirical evidences and credibility from practice exec­
utives, most of the attention is paid on the competitive basis since a SB product is often 
viewed as a clone (copycat or generic) to the NB's. Because of this underlying assumption on 
the inferiority of SB products, it generally limits the retailer's strategy space to whether to 
launch SB products or not (Horowib;, 2000; Haju et aI., 1995), and if so, how the SB should 
promote (in price) to undercut the NB and thus gain market share given certain market 
structure and product characteristics (TvIills, 1999; Raju et a1., 1990; Sayman E't aI., 2(02). 
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On the other hand, from the incumbent manufacturer's (NB's) perspective, the strategic 
decisions are then often confined to how to deter the SB's entrance (Mills, 1999), or how 
to develop effective counter-strategy in order to differentiate the NB from the SB or defend 
leadership in quality (Choi and Coughlan, 2006; Narasimhan and Wilcox, 1998). With this 
paper we address not only pricing strategies a SB can employ, but also advertising strategies. 
Most studies advocate the NB manufacturers to invest in advertising and developing 
new products, while discouraging the SB retailers from advertising but rather promoting 
low prices, as said by Webster (2000) "price is the dominant variable in many store brands' 
value proposition." Although earlier work glean interesting insights into market equilibriums 
in terms of the existence of the SB and its price-promoting strategy in response to the NB's 
actions, these recommendations are mainly based on the assumption of no sustainable strong 
SBs, usually established through brand advertising. This may have been true traditionally 
as Brester and Schroeder (1995) show that the estimates of the marginal effectiveness of 
advertising on generic meats are not significant. However, in recent years, premium SBs 
have been introduced by many retailers to achieve differentiation from other stores and are 
positioned on superior quality rather than price, e.g., "Archer Farms" at Target Corp and 
"Simple Truth" at Kroger Co (Karp, 2012). Levy and Gendel-Gutennan (2012) provide a 
conceptual framework to show the importance of creating a strong SB through advertising 
and innovation. It was found empirically that advertising also has an indirect effect on the 
SB's perceived quality, a most important factor in influencing customer's purchase intention 
of the SB. 
Despite the recently discovered importance of advertising SB products, we find very little 
analytical investigation into how the NB should advertise to influence purchase intention, 
facing the emergence of premium SBs as retailers gear up effort in brand advertising and 
store loyalty. Birwaclker (2011) proposes that investing in holistic brand development pro­
grams benefits not only NB manufacturers but also progressive SB retailers to drive higher 
differentiation and lasting relationship with their shoppers. Karray and Zaccour (2005, 
2006) propose an analytical model in this area that characterizes the equilibrium advertising 
decisions made by each brand when a NB partially covers a SB's advertising costs. Fnr­
thermore BirwacU,er (2011) suggests, to compete for consumers' dollars, joining forces or 
strategic partnerships between store and national brands may be formed in gaining shopper 
insights and identifying focused destination categories. Therefore, the effect of advertising 
can be either category building (also known as informative/complementary) or share stealing 
(persuasive/competitive) as documented by existing literature (Dub6 and Manchanda, 2005; 
Roberts and Samuelson, 1988; Vilcassim ct aI., 1999). 
Despite the rich literature in studying the strategic roles of advertising for firms facing 
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competition, only a few papers examine the interaction between advertising and pricing de­
cision. Vilcassim et al. (1999) propose an oligopoly model to econometrically analyze the 
dynamic pricing and advertising competition among firms and find empirically that firms 
compete on advertising but collaborate on pricing. Karray and Martin-HerrAn (2008) study 
the relationship between the two decisions made sequentially through a game-theoretic model 
and find that in the case of competitive advertising, the pricing effects depends on the inten­
sity of the competition and advertising. However, the target of their retailer's advertising is 
not on the SB product but rather the store itself so such complementary advertising always 
improves both the NB's and SB's demand; while in this paper, we consider premium store 
brands so their advertising campaigns may either be complementary or competitive. In a 
differential game setting, assuming symmetric price sensitivity for both the NB and SB for 
tractability, Karray and lvIart.in-Hern1.n (2009) study the joint advertising and pricing deci­
sions facing the two brands and find the retailer's best response to competitive advertising 
also depends on the intensity of pricing and advertising competition while the manufacturer 
always concedes on price and advertising under greater competition. 
In this paper we employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the NB/SB (man­
ufacturer /retailer) strategic advertising and pricing interaction, in the spirit of Karney and 
Martln-HC'rrAn (2008). Making pricing and product selection decisions has been examined 
thoroughly in the above-mentioned earlier works, however in this work we examine both 
pricing and advertising decisions being made in unison or separately. Specifically, comple­
mentary and competitive advertising is incorporated into the model to evaluate the impact 
of the collaboration/competition level on the two parties' advertising and pricing decisions. 
Attention is given to what advertising and pricing strategy the market leader (the NB man­
ufacturer) would adopt in anticipation of the response from the follower (the SB retailer) 
and the extent to which the two collaborate or compete. In addition to characterizing the 
optimal advertising and pricing decisions by the manufacturer and the retailer, we further 
consider and derive the conditions for the corner solutions in which only one channel member 
exerts efforts in advertising, and the conditions under which premium SB may possibly arise. 
Model and Analysis 
In this section we present the analytical model that determines the NB's and SB's best 
pricing and advertising strategies. In Section 3.1 we introduce the notation of the model and 
present the most general formulation. We start with analyzing special cases of the general 
formulation in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, in which we consider advertising decisions with pricing 




in Section 3.4 we solve the general instance with both pricing and advertising decisions made 
in unison. 
3.1 Notation and Model Setup 
In the model we consider a national brand, NB, and a store brand, SB, each setting their own 
retail prices, Pi with i E {N, S}, where PN is the retail price of the NB and Ps is the retail 
price of the SBI. Similarly both brands will set the amount of advertising effort to exert in 
order to increase market sizes, Ai, i E {N, S}. As supported by the findings in Slldhir (2001) 
and Che et al. (2007), we model the manufacturer-retailer relationship using a manufacturer 
Stackelberg framework. In fact in addition to the two papers above, in a recent literature 
survey no paper was found to use Nash simultaneous moves (Set.huraman, 2009, page 8) in 
this setting. 
The parameters of the model that are exogenously determined will now be discussed. As 
the NB is already established there is a pre-existing base market size AN with neither the 
SB nor NB exerting any additional advertising effort. Without loss of generality, we assume 
the manufacturing costs of both products to be zero. A fraction (3 E (0,1) of all NB sales 
will go the SB as profit, and therefore the wholesale price of the NB product is (1 - (3)PN. 
Though each brand is setting its own advertising decision, as the two brands are selling 
substitutable products, ai measures the spillover effect of advertising effort from i E {N, S} 
to j E {N, S} : j =f i, (as E (0,1) and aN E (-1,1)). For example, aN is the advertising 
effect from NB to SB. The range of aN, is used to capture both complementary, aN > 0, 
and competitive, aN < 0, advertising scenarios. We do not consider as negative, as we do 
not model a national brand advertising directly against a store brand good. 
Since pricing has an effect on the demand for goods of each brand, we introduce ai, i E 
{N, S} as the negative effect of price on the demand for the good sold by i. Similarly, we 
define bi as the positive effect the competitor's price, j E {S, N} has on demand for the 
good sold by i E {N, S} : i =f j. For example, aN measures the impact of PN on the demand 
for NB's product, similarly bN measure the impact of Ps on the demand for NB's product. 
Finally, we use c;,i E {N, S}, to denote the marginal cost of advertising for each of the 
brands. As we will discuss below the advertising cost is assumed to be quadratic in the 
market size. 




Using the notation introduced above, we formally present the profit functions we use in our 
model. We use 7ri to denote the profit of brand i E {N, S}. We define 7rN as: 
For given values of the decision variables, AN and PN, (1) is the profit function of the NB. 
(1 - (3) is the proportion of all NB sales revenue that the NB retains. PN is the per unit 
price of the NB, and (AN + AN + aN As - aNPN + bNPs) are the number of units sold as a 
function of the advertising efforts of both brands (AN + aNAs), the base market size AN, 
and the pricing strategies of both brands bNps - aNPN. Note that we are assuming the cost 
of advertising is not linear but quadratically increasing in the difference of desired and base 
market sizes. While the quadratic functional form captures the diminishing marginal returns 
to advertising as is done in other works (Amrollche et aI., 20D8a,b; Dulle and Manchancla, 
2005; KarnLY and IVlmtfn-Herrrin, 2008, 2009; Vilcassim el; aI., 1999), we further generalize 
the cost function to take into account that the marginal return rate on advertising may be 
decreasing in the base market size AN, i.e., advertising may cost more for the manufacturer 
with high base market size AN to further expand the market. Given the actions of the NB, 
the profit function for the SB can be written as: 
7rs(As,PsIAN,PN) = ps(As + as(AN + AN) - asps + bSPN) (2) 
+(3PN(AN + AN + aNAs - aNPN + bNPs) 
-cs [(As +as(AN +AN))2 - (as (AN +AN))2]. 
Given the advertising and pricing actions of the NB, the first term of the sum in (2) is the 
profit from all the SB sales. The second term is the fraction of the profit the SB receives from 
the NB. Finally, the last term is the cost of advertising decisions made by the SB. Because 
the advertising cost cs [(As + as(AN + AN ))2 - (as(AN + AN))2] is uniquely determined 
by the market size decision As and vice versa, for the ease of explanation, henceforth we 
would use advertising level when referring to Ai, i E {N, S}. Here we assume the SB may 
have an advantage as a follower to inherit a base market size of as(AN + AN), which is 
proportional to the NB's post-advertising market size or irrelevant if as = O. 
In the remainder of this section we first consider two special cases of the general setup, 
first, in Section 3.2, pricing decisions are fixed and only advertising decisions are made and 
second, in Section 3.3, advertising decisions are fixed and only pricing decisions are made. We 
characterize equilibrium decisions in both cases and provide some managerial intuition for 
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these results. We conclude this section by presenting the general case in Section 3.4. In the 
following derivations we omit some steps which we include for completeness in Appendix B. 
3.2 Advertising Only Case 
In this section we first consider the special case where the NB and SB prices are pre­
determined before making advertising decisions. As we model the advertising decisions 
of the national and store brands under a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework, using back­
ward induction, it is straightforward to show the SB's best response function, AS(AN), for 
a given AN value is as written in (3). Since (2) is concave in As, its first order condition 
(FOC) leads to the store brand's reaction function AS(AN): 
PS+{3aNPN _ a (A + A ) if Ps+{3aNPN > A + A 
As (AN) = 2cs S N ---.!:i 2as.cs N---.!:i (3){ o otherwise. 
From (3), we note that As is decreasing in as because the SB benefits from free-riding off of 
the advertising spillover from the NB, while As is increasing in aN due to the share of the 
increasing revenue from selling NB products. Substituting AS(AN) into (1) gives a concave 
function, so the FOC determine the NB's optimal and equilibrium advertising decisions. 
(1-{3)(I-aNas) . PN - AN if PN > fiN and ElL > rP2 CN- PN 
1-{3 . PJ:L - AN if PN > fiN and ElL < A,2 CN _ PN - '-P (4)A::" = 
o if PN :s. fiN and ElL > rPPN 
o otherwise 
and 
Ips + {3aN PN _ a (l-{3)(l-aN as) PN if PN > fiN and Ps > rP2 Cs 2 cs S 2 eN PN 
and ElL < A,o if PN > fiN 
- If'PN (5)As= 1E!i. + {3aN PJ:L - a A and ElL > rP2 Cs 2 Cs S---.!:!.... if PN :s. fiN PN 
o otherwise 
where fiN = (1_{3)(2t.~"N"s)AN and rP = (1- ;J)as(l - aNas)~ - /JaN' The above four cases 
correspond to one interior optimal solution (AN> 0 and As > 0), two corner solutions 
(AN> 0 and As = 0); (AN = 0 and As > 0), and one degenerate solution (AN = As = 0). 
From the conditions for each case, it can be concluded that: first, for the NB to launch any 
advertising campaign, the price of the NB product must exceed some threshold, fiN, which is 
increasing (in weak sense, i.e., non-decreasing) in all parameters eN, AN, ;J, aN, and as when 
the SB's advertising is complementary, i.e., the spillover effect with aN > O. Therefore, the 
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NB will not advertise if any combination of the following scenarios holds: high advertising 
cost, large base market, high fraction of profit going to the retailer, or high spillover rates. 
For the spillover rates, while the free-riding effect of ow is intuitive, it does not seem obvious 
that high NB-to-SB spillover rate as also discourages the NB from advertisement. This 
is the case because high as reduces the SB's advertising effort, which means less spillover 
from the SB advertisement toward the NB product. On the other hand, when the SB's 
advertising is competitive, aN < 0, the price threshold fiN is lower, implying the NB would 
start advertising and invest more in advertisement as competition becomes more intense. 
Second and independently, for the retailer to invest in advertising the SB product, the 
price ratio PS/PN must be high enough, greater than the threshold ¢, which is increasing in 
CS/CN and as (assuming aNaS ~ 0.5) while decreasing in (3 and aN with complementary SB 
advertising. If advertising is one of the key indicators of a premium SB, then a premium SB 
should possess any combination of the following characteristics: low costs of advertising ratio 
CS/CN (ease of advertising in comparison with the NB), low NB advertising spillover (unique 
NB features), high fraction of the NB sales revenue to the retailer (mature NB product so 
the retailer has more bargaining power over the NB), and high SB advertising spillover (high 
substitutability of SB to NB). When the SB advertising becomes competitive, AN increases 
to stay competitive, while As decreases to free-ride from the gain of a higher AN as otherwise 
a SB would reduce its revenue from selling fewer NB goods. 
The non-trivial solutions of As, (5), provide a different aspect in explaining the SB's 
advertising strategy: the first term PsiCs corresponds to the effort for its own SB product 
while the second term (3aNPN / Cs corresponds to the effect of NB sales due to the share 
(3 of all NB revenue and advertising spillover aN. When both SB and NB advertise, the 
advertising effort is adjusted down by spilled efforts from the NB's advertisement as(l ­
(3)(1 - aNas)PN/CN, and when only the SB advertises the benefit is adjusted by the base 
market size. 
3.3 Pricing Only Case 
In this section we consider the case in which for given advertising expenditures of the NB 
and SB, each may only maximize their expected profit by setting their pricing strategies, PN 
and Ps respectively. Carrying out backward induction we can show that (2) is concave in 
Ps for a given PN and fixed advertising strategies. Determining the optimal SB price for a 
given PN leads to: 
* ( ) As + as(AN + AN) + (bs + (3bN )PN




It can be readily seen from (6) that first, the SB's best response pricing decision PS(PN) is 
increasing in the market size (or equivalently, marketing efforts made by itself and spilled 
from the NB). Second, P'S(PN) is linearly increasing in PN because of competing effects bs 
and f3bN, We can then substitute PS(PN) in (1) and find the equilibrium NB price, P'N, via 
FOCs: 
(7) 
The form of P'N in (7) shows that it is increasing in both advertising efforts: the first part 
of the numerator (AN + AN + O<NAs) is the direct effect from self, NB, advertising and SB 
spillover efforts, while the second part /J:s [As + o<s(AN + AN)] reflects the indirect effect 
from the SB pricing strategy influenced by the SB advertising and NB advertising spillover. 
In the denominator, the sensitivity of NB demand to NB price is dampened from aN to 
aN - /J:s(bs + f3bN) due to the competing price of the SB, Ps, in (5) that is also increasing 
PN. We may find P'S by substituting (7) into (6), which we omit in this exposition. Note 
that to ensure the concavity of the NB's profit function, (7) is only valid in the case that: 
(8) 

Inequality (8) requires the direct demand sensitivity aN to be not totally offset by the indirect 
competing effect g::s (bs + f3bN). Should the downward slope aN be overly compensated 
and become upward sloping (inequality (8) is violated meaning the profit function becomes 
convexly increasing), it is then to the NB's advantage to set P'N as high as possible to gain 
infinite profit, which is not a well-defined scenario. Due to this seemingly degenerate scenario, 
we do not consider it in detail in this paper. 
As pricing is a focal point of this subsection, we glean further insights by investigating 
the relative magnitude of the two prices, P'N and P'S. To have P'N > P'S as most commonly 
seen, the following relationship must hold: 
(9) 
The left hand side of (9) is the advertising effort ratio measuring the NB's effort with respect 
to the SB's with the adjustment (bN/2aS) due to price competition. The right hand side 
measures the NB's demand sensitivity in price with respect to the SB's. The conditions in 
which this inequality is violated so that P'N ~ P'S characterize a premium SB. From (9) we 
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determine that a premium store brand will exists, for a set of fixed advertising decisions in 
the complementary advertising setting, if: the spillover rate is high from NB to SB (as) and 
a powerful retailer (fJ), maybe due to a mature NB product, and the spillover rate is low 
from SB to NB (aN), perhaps due to some unique properties of the SB product. 
As we allow for competitive advertising, i.e., aN < 0, we observe that in this case 
there is a theoretical possibility for PN to be negative or zero. However, for this to occur, 
AN + AN < laNIAs, which means the SB must put forth so much advertising effort that it 
advertises more than the NB and the base market size and effectively advertises the NB out 
of existence. Though theoretically feasible, we know of no such SB that has so much market 
power that it can ever impact the NB price to such a great extent. 
3.4 General Case 
This section considers the general case in which each brand determines its optimal advertising 
and pricing decisions in tandem. We assume that the NB sets its pricing and advertising 
decisions before the SB. Through backward induction, we find the best response functions of 
the SB, i.e., As(AN, PN) and pS(AN' PN). We will then substitute the best response functions 
of the SB into the NB's profit function to determine the NB's optimal adverting and pricing 
levels, i.e., AN and PN' 
We first start with the SB's best response functions by considering its FOCs with respect 
to As and Ps to find As(AN,PN) and pS(AN,PN): 
bs+f3bN+2f3asaNp _ a (A + A ) if bs+f3bN+2f3asaNp > A + AA* (A ) _ 4ascs-l N S N --..!':{ <>s(4ascs-l) N N--..!':{S N,PN - 0{ otherwise. 
(10) 
f3aN+2bscs+2f3bNcsp if bs+f3bN+2f3asaNp > A + A 
* (A ) - 4ascs-l N a:s(4ascs-l) N N--..!:!...Ps N,PN - . . (11){ o otherwIse. 
To ensure optimality of (10) and (11) the second order optimality conditions (SOCs) must 
be satisfied, i.e., the Hessian of (2) must be negative semidefinite, equivalently 4ascs > 1 
must hold. 
Substituting the SB's best response functions (10) and (11) into (1), and we find the 





To ensure that (12) is negative semidefinite, and that the PN and AN we find using FOCs 
are maximums, the following condition must hold as a lower bound on eN: 
(1 - owas)2(1- (3) (13) 
To have a valid bound, the denominator of the RHS (right hand side) must be positive, i.e., 
a > a (bs+bNi3+2asC<Ni3) + b C<Ni3+2bscs+2bNi3cS. This requires the direct demand sensitivity N N 4ascs-l N 4ascs-1 
to be not totally offset by the indirect competing advertising effect aN (bs+b;!s~:a~C<Ni3) and 
competing pricing effect bNC<Ni3+!~~~~~~bNi3cS. Analogous to inequality (8) in the pricing-only 
case, except for the additional competing advertising effect, should the downward slope aN 
be overly compensated and become upward sloping, NB then sets PN as high as possible to 
gain infinite profit, which is not a well-defined scenario. We now find PN and AN of the NB 
using the FOCs 0!:.l:!.. = 0 and a"N = 02 :
aAN apN 




=* PN(AN) = (1- (3)~;~ aNas) (AN + AN) (3, as, OW E (0,1), (14) 
07rN = 0 
OPN 
=* .6.(AN + AN) = 0 after substituting the value of PN(AN). (15) 
The functional form of PN(AN), (14), shows a linear relationship between PN and AN. The 
optimal form of AN' shown in (15), has AN = -AN as .6. is a constant with respect to PN 
and AN' This means that no interior solution exists to 7rN(AN,PNIAS(AN,PN),Ps(AN,PN)) 
as we require the advertising effort exerted, AN, and the base market size, AN, to be 
non-negative. Therefore, as AN E [0,00), AN = 0 or AN is unbounded. However, as 
7rN(AN,PNIAS(AN,PN ),pS(AN,PN)) is concave, guaranteed by (13) and we identified at least 
one interior stationary point, then for all values of AN > -AN, 7rN(AN,PNIAS(AN,PN ),pS(AN,PN)) 
is decreasing. This means that the optimal feasible advertising effort for the NB is AN = O. 
The fact that AN = 0 may be comforting as the only other option is to have AN -+ 00, 
which would indicate the NB could turn its first mover advantage into a "money pump." 
The result in this section may seem counter intuitive as NBs still advertise in the presence 
of SBs. However, as the special cases in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 indicate, if either the the 




pricing or advertising decisions are fixed, then the other decision may not necessarily be 
trivial (zero). This may indeed be the case as in some organizations pricing and advertising 
decisions may be made sequentially as is indicated by Eastlack and Rao (1986) in the case 
of V-8. Alternatively, there may be externalities that force firms, national brands included, 
to advertise as discussed by McDonald and Wren (2012), we do not model such externalities 
in this paper. 
We conclude this section by discussion the implications of our results. From (10) and (11) 
we note that A* ..t. 0 and p* < p* if and only if {JaN+2b scs+2/3bNcs < 1. However as noteds r S N 4aSC$ 1 ) 
previously a premium store brand may actually set P'S such that P'S 2: piv, which implies 
/3aN+2bscs+2/3bNCS > 1. This occurs if (3 is large i.e. SB receives a larger fraction of NB4ascs 1 - ) , 
sales, in the case of strong SB market power. Similarly when ow is large, i.e., there is large 
spillover from NB advertising to SB demand, this may occur in the case of strong substitutes 
between SB and NB goods. To summarize, though the NB does not advertise and the SB 
may set P'S 2: piv in the general case of our model, we discussed that corporations may still 
advertise and price if these decisions are made in sequence or separately from one another. 
Insight and Conclusion 
This work adds to the literature on advertising and pricing interplay that exists between a 
national brand and a store brand good. With the strong rise in store brand market share and 
the propensity of stores to launch premium store brands, we believe the managerial insights 
for both a retailer, store brand, and a manufacturer, national brand, will be of great interest. 
Table 1 summarizes the main contributions of this article using a stylized model. When only 
advertising decisions are considered, we found that premium store brands strive for a low 
NB spillover rate and a high SB spillover rate (or low competitive effect from SB adver­
tising); while when only considering pricing decisions, however, we found that the opposite 
conditions are preferred, i.e., high NB and low SB spillover (high with SB competition) rates 
encourage premium store brands. It is important to note that whether the SB advertising is 
competitive or complementary has a deciding effect on how the retailer's bargaining power 
over the wholesale price would influence the advertising and pricing strategies. Hence the 
characterization of a premium store brand depends on which marketing/promotion instru­
ment (advertising or pricing) is the primary method for driving the demand. In the case when 
both methods are simultaneously utilized, the national brand manufacturer always exerts 
no advertising effort and free-rides the retailer. However, it may not be the case that both 
pricing and advertising decisions are made simultaneously, but rather a repeated/sequential 
process is used to determine the final equilibrium decisions. 
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I Section I Decisions Results 
NB advertises iff PN > PN while SB advertises iff lli > </>. 
Premium S B will exert advertising effort As if it PN has: 
• low advertising cost ratio .ffl.CN 
• low NB spillover as 
§3.2 Advertising 
• for aN > 0, high SB complementary advertising aN 
• for aN < 0, low SB competing advertising aN 
• high retail margin f3 when .ffl. > (I-aN); or low 
eN as -aNO:Sf3 otherwise 
• high NB spillover as 
§3.3 Pricing 
• for aN > 0, low SB complementary advertising aN 
• for aN < 0, high SB competing advertising aN 
• high retail margin f3 
NB never advertises so AN = °< As and PN > Ps iff 
/laN+2bscs+2/3bNCS < 1. Premium SB will price P*s > P*N if 
4ascs 1 
it has: 
• for aN > 0, high SB complementary advertising aNAdvertising§3.4 & Pricing 
• for aN < 0, low SB competing advertising aN 
• high retail margin f3 when -aN < 2bNCs; or low f3 
otherwise 
Table 1: A summary of the main results. 
In the future, using retail data, it will be interesting to develop empirical methods to 
identify favorable market conditions for a premium store brand. In addition to this empirical 
question, some analytical questions remain unanswered. In particular, this article assumes 
that the advertising cost function is quadratic. This is a fine analytical assumption with 
diminishing return on investment, but in practice there might exist some other function 
governing the cost-demand relationship, such as an "S-shaped" function. Using historical 
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retail data, we would like to derive particular functional forms for the cost-demand function 
and derive the optimal decisions and compare them to what occurs in practice. Finally, we 
would also like to extend our model to take into account the case in which a national and a 
store brand make decisions simultaneously, i.e., there is no leader-follower dominance. 
As one can see, there are quite a few open areas of research in this field. However, we 
think that this work is a necessary step to help retailers make more informed store brand 
decisions and national brand manufacturers be better prepared to respond to the introduction 
of additional store brands. 
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A List of Mathematical Symbols and Notation 
SB: Store Brand 
NB: National Brand 
Ps: the retail price of the SB good 
PN: the retail price of the NB good 
16 
As: the market size of the SB, also referred to as the advertising effort exerted by the SB 
AN: the market size of the NB, also referred to as the advertising effort exerted by the NB 
AN: the base market size for the NB good 
/3: the fraction of the NB sales that are retained by the SB, retailer, we assume /3 E (0,1) 
as: the advertising spillover from the NB to the SB, we assume as E (0,1) 
aN: the advertising spillover from the SB to the NB, we assume aN E (-1,1); aN < 0 
models a competitive advertising environment and aN > 0 models a complementary 
advertising environment 
as: the negative effect of Ps on demand for the SB good 
aN: the negative effect of PN on demand for the NB good 
bs : the positive effect of PN on demand for the SB good 
bN : the positive effect of Ps on demand for the NB good 
Cs: the cost of advertising effort exerted by the SB 
CN: the cost of advertising effort exerted by the NB 
7rs(As, psIAN, PN): the profit function of the SB 
7rN(AN,PN): the profit function of the NB 
B Mathematical Appendix 
In this appendix we provide the details of the results presented in Section 3. 
B.l Advertising Only Case 
ps(As + as(AN + AN) - asps + bSPN) (16) 
+/3PN(AN + AN + aNAs - aNPN + bNps) 
-cs [(As + as(AN + AN ))2 - (as(AN + AN ))2] . 
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Its Foe leads to the profit maximizer As: 
d7rs(AsIAN)
dAs = Ps + (30tNPN - 2cs(As + as (AN + AN)) = 0 
~ A* - Ps + (3aNPN (A + A )
---,'" s - 2 - as N N (17)Cs ­
In (17) As is an interior point solution, including non-negativity constraint on As we have: 
PS+{3C<NPN _ a (A + A ) if PS+{3C<NPN > A + A 
As(AN) = 2cs S N ---.l:{ 2c<~cs - N ---.l:{. (18){ o otherwise. 
Note that we know the interior point is a maximum as 7rs(AsIAN) is concave, d2"S~~1IAN) = 
s 
-2cs :s: O. 
Using (18), we may rewrite 7rN(AN) as: 
7rN(AN) = (1 - (3)PN (AN + AN + aN (pS+g:;PN - as (AN + AN)) - aNPN + bNPs) 
- CN [(AN + AN)2 - AN2]. 
We now find the FOe for 7rN(AN): 
First note that 7rN(AN) is concave, d2";:.~AN) = -2CN :s: O. For AN to be non-negative, it 
N 
implies PN > (I (3)tlcry )AN. Substituting the interior point value of A*N· into PSt{3C<NPN > 
- - -ctNets - OsCs ­
AN + AN, the condition of interior As in (18), we have: 
Ps + (3aNPN > (1 - (3)PN(1 - aNas) 
2ascs - 2CN 
Ps Cs 
==} -?: (1 - (3)as(1- aNas)- - (3aN.
PN CN 
Using the notation defined in Section 3.2, we let PN = (1_!3)(2t~C<NC<S)AN and ¢> = (1- (3)as(l­
aNaS)~ - (3aN. For each advertising decision, As' and AN, we have four possible scenarios: CN 
both solutions are interior, only one of them is interior, or none of them are interior. They 







. PN - AN 
cN­if PN ? PN and HPN >,1.,- 'Y 
A~= 
1-13 l!.!i.
-2- . CN 
o 
A 









Note that the second case of (28) follows from As = 0 meaning the profit of the NB is 
7fN(AN) = (1 - (3)PN(AN + AN + aNPN + bNPs) - CN [(AN + AN)2 - AN2] . Using FOe we 
have: 
Note that in this case d2"d~~AN) = -1 < 0 meaning that 7fN(AN) is concave. 
N 
Similarly for As we have: 
l~ + !3aN l!.!i. _ a (1-!3)(I-aN aS) l!.!i. and H >,1.,if PN ? PN2 cs 2 cs S 2 eN PN - 'Y 
o if PN ? PN and H < ¢ PN (20)As = l~ + !3aN l!.!i. - a A andH>,I.,if PN < PN2 Cs 2 rs S-.!!.... PN - 'Y 
o otherwise 
Note that the third case of (29) follows from AN = 0 meaning the profit of the SB is 7fs(As) = 
ps(As+asAN-asps+bsPN)+{3PN(AN+aNA s-aNPN+bNPs)-cs [(As + asAN J2 - (asAN )2] 
Using FOe we have: 
d7fs(As)
dAs = Ps + (3aNPN - 2cs(As + asAN) = 0 
~ A* - PS+{3aNPN A 
---,- s - 2 - as N·Cs ­
Just as with the other cases, d271,fs) = -2cs ::; 0 meaning that 7fs(As) is concave. 
s 
B.2 Pricing Only Case 
ps(As + as(AN + AN) - asps + bSPN) (21) 

+(3PN(AN + AN + aNAS - aNPN + bNPs) 

-cs [(As + as(AN + AN))2 - (as(AN + AN))2]. 
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We now explore the FOe of the SB profit function assuming advertising decisions are fixed. 
As + as(AN + AN) - asps + bSPN - asps + (JPNbN = 0 
As + as(AN + AN) + bSPN + (JPNbN (22)
2as 
First note that d2"sdPfiPN) = -2as which means 7rS(PSIPN) is concave in PS. Note that all of Ps 
the terms in the right hand side of (22) are positive, so the interior solution PS(PN) is always 
feasible. 
We now write 7rN(PN) , given PS(PN): 
As + as(AN + AN) + bSPN + (JPNbN))(1 - (J)PN ( AN + AN + aNAs - aNPN + bN ( 2as 
-CN [(AN + AN)2 - AN2]. 
(1 - (J) ( AN + AN + aNAs - aNPN + ;:s (As + as(AN + AN) + bSPN + (JPNbN)) 
+(1 - (J)PN (-aN + ;:s (bs + (JbN)) = 0 
AN + AN + aNAs + #:s (As + as(AN + AN)) 





"J;;tN ) = 2(1 - (J) U,:: (bs + (JbN) - aN)' in order to ensure concavity we must 
have aN 2: g,:: (bs + (JbN). The numerator of PH is always positive, only the denominator 
may be negative in the case aN < ~(bs + (JbN), in order to ensure PH is non-negative we 
have add the condition that aN > ;N (bs + (JbN) and to avoid division by zero, which is 
_as 
stronger than the concavity condition. As discussed in Section 3.3, we do not consider the 
case of PH :::: 0 even when aN is negative, as this would imply a SB may advertise a NB out 
of existence. 
B.3 General Case 
ps(As + as(AN + AN) - asps + bSPN) (23) 

+(JPN(AN + AN + aNAs - aNPN + bNPs) 







_ [ Ps + (3PND!N - 2cs(As + D!S(AN + AN)) ] (25)(As + D!S(AN + AN) - 2asPs + bSPN) + (3PNbN 
(26) 
-2cs 1 ] (27)[ 1 -2as 
For the SB's best response to the NB's actions AN andpN, we solve for FOes, 'i77Ts(As,PsIAN,PN) = 
[ ~ ], to find AS(AN,PN) and PS(AN,PN): 
Ps + (3PND!N - 2cs(As + D!S(AN + AN)) - 0 
(As + D!S(AN + AN) - 2asPs + bSPN) + (3PNbN - 0 
Ps - 2cs(As + D!S(AN + AN)) - (3PND!N 
As - -(3PNbN - D!S(AN + AN) + 2as . (2cs(As + D!S(AN + AN)) - (3PND!N) - (3PND!N - bSPN 
As(l - 4ascs) - -(3PNbN - D!S(AN + AN) + 4ascs(D!s(AN + AN)) - 2aS(3PND!N - (3PND!N - bSPN 
(-bs - (3bN - 2(3aSD!N)PN + D!s(4ascs -l)(AN + AN) 
bs+!3bN+2!3aS<>Np _ D! (A + A ) if bs +!3bN+2!3aS<>N > A + A 
_ 4ascs-1 N S N -.l'!.. <>s(4ascs 1) p N N-.l'!.. 





/3"N+2bscs+2/3bNCS P if bs+/3bN+2/3as"NP > A + A 
4ascs-l N frs(4ascs-l) N N---1i 
o otherwise. 
Given the optimal values ofpS(AN,PN) and AS(AN,PN) we rewrite 1rN(AN,PN) as: 




Given this condition, we consider '\l7rN(AN,PN) = [ ~ ]: 
PN 
o 
A - (1 - (3)(1 - ) + 4 2as{3cx'!v+2{3cxNbN+bsCXN+2{3csb'!v+2bscsbN-aN(4ascs-l) Note
w lere '-" - iY-NiY-S eN (4 1)(1) . " ases -owCXs 
that in an interior solution, AN = -AN, however as AN ;:0: 0 and AN ;:0: 0 an interior solution 
is not feasible and only a corner solution exists. A corner solution is the only option for 
AN E [0, (0). As an interior stationary point exists and by construction 7rN(AN,PN) is 
concave, we know that 7rN(AN,PN) is increasing for all values of AN < -AN and decreasing 




C Sensitivity Analysis on (3 
The optimal decisions, pricing and advertising, determined in Section 3 may depend on the 
wholesale price that we model using an exogenously set parameter (3. In this section we 
examine how these decisions change with (3. 
From Section 3.2 we know that when Ps and PN are fixed, the optimal advertising deci­
sions are: 
(l-{3)(l-aN a s) • l!.!:L _ A if PN > PN and lli. > ¢>2 eN---.l:!.... PN 
1-{3 . l!.!:L - AN
2 eN _ if PN > PN and lli. < " PN - If' (28)Al\r = 





IE,;: + {3aN PN _ a (l-{3)(l-aN a s) l!.!:L if PN > PN and lli. > ¢>2 Cs 2 Cs S 2 eN PN 
o if PN > PN and lli. < " PN - If'A* (29)s= 1 E,;: + {3aN l!.!:L - asA and lli. > ¢>ifPN SPN2 Cs 2 Cs -1:i PN 
o otherwise 
We take the derivative of each decision with respect to (3 to determine how each will change 
with the wholesale price: 
(l-aNa s) . l!.!:L ifPN > PN and lli. > ¢>2 eN PN 





9'.I:!..PN + a (l-aNa s) PN and Ps > ¢>ifPN > PN2 Cs S 2 eN PN 
o if PN > PN and lli. < " PN - 'f' (31)
aN T!..K if PN S PN and lli. > ¢>2 es PN 
o otherwise 
From the equation (30) and (31) we note that the NB will decrease their advertising ef­
fort with (3, Le., lower wholesale price will lead to lower advertising effort. Conversely, as 
wholesale price decreases, (3 increases, the SB will exert larger effort in the case advertising 
campaigns are complementary, aN is positive. However, in the case advertising campaigns 
are competitive, the effect of (3 on the SB advertising decision may depend on the relative 
magnitude between aN and as among other parameters, Le., whether the direct competing 
effect a N l!.!:L is stronger than indirect spillover effect as (l-a.;"as ) PN • 2 Cs ~ eN 
In the pricing only case we have: 
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and 
Looking at the partial derivatives we have: 
oP'N AN + AN + aNAS + /j!fs [As + asIAN + AN)1 (32) 
ofJ - 2 [aN - /j!fs(bs + fJbNf 
and 
ops _ bN (* RPartiaIP'N) (33)ofJ - 2as PN + f.' ofJ . 
From equation (32) we note that PN is always increasing in fJ. The same relationship holds 
for Ps as PN(fJ) :2: 0 by condition (8), and thus Ps is also increasing in fJ. 
We finally consider the general case: 
-P'N (l-fl)(I-aNas) 
A*N - 0 
and 
--1 obS+~~~:~~saNP'N - aSAN if bs~:t:';~:~l)NP'N > AN 
o otherwise. 
flC<N+2bscs+2flbNCSp* if bs+flbN+2flasC<N p* > A 4ascs-l N a:s(4ascs 1) N --..!:l.. 
otherwise. 




if bs+flbN+2flasC<Np* > A a:s(4ascs-l) N ---.!:!.... 
otherwise. (35)if bs+flbN+2{3asaNp* > A 






From (34) we note that PN is decreasing in {3 for the general hand. Things are not so obvious 
for the SB, As and Ps may increase or decrease with {3 depending on the relationships between 
the terms. If the first term of each of the partials is greater than the second then, the optimal 
decisions decrease with {3, otherwise they both increase with {3. 
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